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Recent changes to the organisation of Australia’s education system have 
raised the possibility of implementing wide-ranging market reforms. In 
this paper we discuss the scope for introducing reforms similar to the 
UK’s “quasi-market” model. Firstly, we discuss the role of school league 
tables in providing signals and incentives within a quasi-market model. 
Specifically, we compare a range of unadjusted and model-based league 
tables of primary school performance in Queensland’s public education 
system. These comparisons indicate that model-based tables that account 
for socio-economic status and student intake quality vary significantly 
from the unadjusted tables. Secondly, we test for school competition 
effects in the existing regulated education market. The results indicate that 
competition between government schools has a positive effect on school 
efficiency while competition from the non-government sector has a 









The debate about the appropriate method of providing mass education has a long history 
and has focused on the merits of alternative state and market-based approaches. A trend 
towards increased state provision of education was evident until the late 1970s and early 
1980s when “New Right” governments in the US, UK and elsewhere began to introduce 
reforms that emphasised a greater role for market forces. As Tooley (1996) notes, 
governments can intervene in education by regulating its content (e.g.: with respect to 
curriculum and testing), its demand (through compulsory attendance laws), and through 
determining the level of funding and provision. State-based provision is generally 
characterised as a situation where the government funds “free” schooling from general 
taxation revenue and centrally administers the education system according to non-market 
criteria. This model is thought to be effective at internalising the social benefits of 
education, such as citizenship, support for democratic institutions and knowledge 
spillovers1. Most importantly, it is argued that state provision of education is needed to 
avoid the greater social segregation and income inequality that would eventuate in a 
market-based system.              
 
In contrast, advocates of market-based approaches to education argue that inequality of 
educational opportunity will exist even under a centralised system of state provision 
(Chubb and Moe 1988, Smith and Tomlinson 1989). Furthermore, it is argued that state 
provision is associated with higher levels of technical and allocative inefficiency. In turn, 
the existence of these inefficiencies leads to a lower level of resources and services, 
thereby limiting the scope to reduce educational inequality and under-achievement 
(Hoxby 1996).      
 
 In Australia, the debate on the role of market forces and state provision in the education 
system has intensified in recent years. Most notably, there has been an ongoing, high-
profile debate on the funding of non-government schools and the efficacy of “voucher”-
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type mechanisms in allocating funding between private and state-run schools 
(Buckingham 2000, Macklin 2002). However, there have been two other significant 
policy developments in the organisation of primary and secondary education in Australia. 
Firstly, in 1998 the Coalition Government (under then Education Minister David Kemp) 
mandated the introduction of standardised literacy and numeracy testing across Australian 
primary schools. Comprehensive testing programmes were introduced for students at the 
Year 3, 5 and 7 level in order to measure progress on nationally agreed benchmarks for 
literacy and numeracy skills2. This reform was significant because it overcame the 
political resistance to the use of testing as a major performance indicator that existed 
among some stakeholders in the education sector.  
 
Secondly, in the wake of the Kemp reforms, state governments have begun to make use 
of test-score and other data in allocating funds and organising service delivery. In 
particular, the Victorian government has recently taken a major step in releasing school-
level information on Year 12 academic results and other school characteristics to the 
public. This means that, for the first time in Australia, parents, the media and other 
interested parties are able to construct “league tables” of relative school achievement. 
Indeed, the Victorian government’s move was welcomed by the media and gained some 
popularity with the general public for this reason (Yaman and Nason 2002).         
 
These developments are reminiscent of reforms to the British education system in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The Thatcher Government’s 1988 Education Reform Act ushered 
in the most important series of changes to the organisation of state education in Britain 
since the 1944 Education Act. The government’s aim was to liberalise the provision of 
public education and promote the concepts of parental choice, school competition and 
managerial decentralisation. A number of policy measures were implemented to facilitate 
this agenda including: the introduction of pupil-based formula funding, the publication of 
school examination results (“league tables”), the establishment of a powerful school 
inspection agency and the promotion of school-level governance. However, these reforms 
are best described as a market-oriented modification of the system of public provision 
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rather than a full privatisation of the education system a la a voucher model. Le Grand 
(1991) and others (Bradley et al 2000, Glennerster 1991) have therefore characterised the 
British system as a “quasi-market” where market mechanisms play a significant role in 
determining the economic efficiency of a publicly provided education system. 
 
In Australia, the emergence of a national testing system and the public release of school-
level academic results raises the possibility of future market-oriented reforms. Therefore, 
in this paper we analyse the performance of Australian schools and reflect on what 
lessons can be learnt from the British experience with quasi-markets. Specifically, we 
measure the technical efficiency of a large sample of Queensland primary schools using 
the method of data envelopment analysis (DEA), a common approach in the education 
economics literature (Worthington 2001). In turn, we use the results of this analysis to 
discuss the determinants of school performance and the efficacy of using publicly 
available “league tables” of school-level achievement to facilitate parental choice and 
competitive discipline in the education system. Such league tables are a major component 
of the quasi-market policy framework and an analysis of how they signal school quality 
and promote competition is of vital interest to Australian policy debates.   
 
Indeed, our analysis indicates that a simple, “unadjusted” league tables system has the 
potential to have both perverse and beneficial effects on the efficiency of the education 
system. The balance of these effects hinges on the extent to which “raw” league tables 
convey information about school efficiency or quality. The results of our DEA models 
indicate that league tables based on average scores do not adequately reflect the influence 
of socio-economic factors and student intake quality on school performance. In turn, we 
conclude that any Australian quasi-market model utilising league tables must be designed 
in a detailed “evidence-based” fashion that balances the dynamic costs and benefits of 
introducing market mechanisms.    
 
We believe that this comparison with the British system is justified for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the direction of current policy developments (particularly the Victorian 
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reforms) indicates that Australian governments are more likely to change the education 
system in ways that are consistent with a quasi-market rather than a “school-choice” 
model3. Secondly, the idea of quasi-markets has received high-profile attention from 
members of both sides of politics who are interested the interface between markets and 
government (Abbot 2000, Botsman and Latham 2002). Despite this interest, academic 
research in Australia that explicitly addresses these issues has been limited.  Thirdly, 
attempts at microeconomic reform in other sectors of the economy have been plagued by 
design and implementation problems (Quiggin 1996). Detailed research on school 
performance is therefore needed to prevent reform proceeding in an ill-conceived or 
piecemeal fashion. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Firstly, we review the evidence on the British quasi-
market with a special reference to its institutional structure. In turn, we use this review to 
motivate some specific questions for the analysis of school performance in Australia. The 
third section outlines the methodology of the study with respect to educational production 
functions and the use of data envelopment (DEA) analysis. Fourth, we discuss the results 
of our DEA analysis with special reference to the influence of socio-economic variables 
and student intake quality. Finally, we review the policy implications of the study with 
respect to the use of school league tables, arguably the central component of the quasi-
market model.     
 
2 EVIDENCE ON QUASI-MARKETS IN EDUCATION 
 
The British quasi-market in education evolved as the result of a collection of policy 
changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s rather than as the outcome of a detailed, pre-
conceived plan. Table 1 provides an overview of quasi-market forces in terms of factors 
such as decentralisation, incentives, information, choice and voice. This allows us to 
identify the major components of the quasi-market along with their main functions. For 
example, the introduction of formula funding (based on age-weighted pupil numbers) and 
open enrolment was instrumental in exposing the distribution of schooling resources to 
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the forces of demand and supply. Local school management and governance 
complemented this by facilitating decentralisation and allowing schools to differentiate 
themselves in terms of services and quality. Arguably, the publication of school 
performance tables was the most significant change. It provided parents with information 
on school quality (broadly defined) and schools with an incentive to improve their 
academic performance. In combination with the other reforms, this promoted competition 
between schools and was a major driver of performance improvement in the education 
system during the 1990s (Bradley et al 2000).   
 
Early discussions of the quasi-market raised the concern that market mechanisms could 
amplify inequality in the education system (Glennerster 1991) and this continues to be a 
theme in applied research on the topic. Firstly, it has become clear that schools have 
responded to the quasi-market reforms in ways consistent with the operation of market 
forces (Bradley et al 2000). Most notably, the introduction of quasi-market forces affected 
the allocation of pupils between schools. For example, the dependence of new student 
admissions on the comparative exam performance of schools increased in the first four 
years of the quasi-market. This indicates that parental choice was influenced by school 
performance, as reported by the published league tables. Furthermore, school sizes 
fluctuated in patterns consistent with increased competition – high performing schools 
(measured in terms of exam performance) expanded in size while less effective schools 
lost enrolments (Bradley and Taylor 1998).     
 
In regard to equity, a further analysis by Bradley and Taylor (2002) found that social 
segregation in the composition of schools increased under the quasi-market. Again, high-
performing schools experienced a reduction in the number of pupils coming from less 
wealthy families while less successful schools experienced the opposite effect. However, 
the presence of competitive forces also appeared to be related to a significant 
improvement in performance, as measured by exam results. Other research focusing on 
social segregation has shown that parents are sensitive to differences in school 
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performance, as reflected by house prices (Cheshire and Shepard 2002, Gibbons and 
Machin 2001).      
 
Specific aspects of the quasi-market’s contribution to widening inequality have been 
addressed in a number of studies (Adnett and Davies 2002, Goldstein and Spiegelhalter  
1996, Mayston 2000, Wilson 2003).  The role of league tables has been a major theme in 
this research. In particular, these studies have emphasised how the measures used in the 
School Performance Tables and other indicators work to exert competitive pressure 
within the quasi-market. Different performance indicators create different incentives for 
“gaming the system”, that is, adjusting schooling policies to maximise test scores 
indirectly rather than value-adding to the skills of every student. For example, schools can 
operate “cream-skimming” policies where they are selective with either their intake of 
students or with their choice of which students undertake key exams. Furthermore, the 
specification of particular performance targets and benchmarks also encourages schools 
to concentrate on the education of students just below or above these targets in order to 
maximise average school performance. This has the potential to skew resources and effort 
away from students at alternate ends of the ability distribution.  
 
Arguably, the key message of this critique of the quasi-market is that adverse institutional 
incentives can alter the relationship between maximisation of school performance and the 
development of student’s human capital. This makes the identification of such adverse 
incentives and behavioural responses a key policy issue.  
 
Recent reforms undertaken at the state and federal level in Australia have parallels with 
the development of the UK quasi-market. The Kemp reforms in the area of literacy and 
numeracy testing have created a new source of academic output measures for use in 
performance appraisal and resource allocation models. More recently, the Victorian 
government’s initiative of releasing school-level academic performance indicators is 
reminiscent of the initial School Performance Tables system in the UK. In particular, the 
Victorian tables report raw or unadjusted indicators, that is, they do not control for the 
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heterogenous backgrounds and abilities of students across schools. This problem applies 
even for the “transition profile” of post Year 12 destinations that is reported as part of the 
Victorian model (see Table2). As the critique outlined above suggests, this approach can 
limit the effectiveness of quasi-market mechanisms. In turn, we can pose two practical 
questions for the consideration of quasi-markets in the Australian education system. 
Firstly, how well do unadjusted league tables perform as signals of school performance, 
given the important role of socio-economic status and student intake quality ? And 
secondly, to what extent are market forces – particularly those related to school 
competition - already operating in Australia’s regulated education system?   
 
3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Methodology 
 
The methodology of our study is based on the estimation of an educational production 
function for schools using the frontier measurement technique of data envelopment 
analysis (DEA). This is a useful approach since it allows us to discuss the educational 
production function (EPF) in the context of a method that has a firm foundation in neo-
classical production economics.   
 
Following Hanushek (1979:354) educational production functions are “generally 
statistical analyses relating observed student outcomes to the characteristics of students, 
their families, and other students in the school, as well as the characteristics of schools”. 
The majority of EPF studies use some type of standardised test score as their measure of 
output. However, it is also possible to incorporate other types of outcomes as outputs, for 
example, student absence rates, success in tertiary entrance or student satisfaction. At the 
school-level, the production function describes how schools transform student inputs into 
the specified output. A school-level production function can be defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )itititiit ISPBfA ,,,=     (1) 
where for the ith school, Ait = average achievement at time t; Bit = a vector of inputs 
related to the average family background characteristics of students (cumulative to time 
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t); Sit = a cumulative vector of school inputs (e.g.: resources, teacher quality), Pit = a 
vector of average peer influences operating among students at the school, cumulative to 
time t; and Ii = a vector representing the average level of innate or prior ability of the 
students at the school.         
 
The technical relationships expressed in this production function can then be translated 
into a framework based on efficiency measurement (Coelli et al 1998, Worthington 
2001). The three central concepts here are technical, allocative and productive efficiency. 
These concepts are illustrated in Figure 1 for the output-oriented case involving two 
outputs (y1 and y2) and one input (x1). The production possibilities curve is represented by 
ZZ’ which gives the combination of outputs for a given levels of input. The firm A 
operates below the production possibilities frontier such that the distance AB represents 
technical inefficiency. Practically, this can be interpreted as the amount by which outputs 
could be increased without additional inputs. Using price information, we can draw an 
isorevenue line as DD’. The distance BC can then be interpreted as the extent of 
allocative inefficiency since it represents the cost reductions that could occur if 
production took place at the economically efficient point B’. Total economic efficiency 
equals the sum of technical and allocative efficiency, defined either as a ratio (0A/0C) or 
as a distance representing economic inefficiency (AC).     
 
Linear programming methods can then be used to construct a non-parametric piece-wise 
frontier or surface with efficiency measures calculated relative to this surface. Given data 
on K inputs and M outputs for N firms, we represent these as a column vectors xi and yi 
for the ith firm. Then for each firm we obtain a measure of outputs over all inputs, such as 
u’yi / v’xi where u is an M×1 vector of output weights and v is K×1 vector of input 
weights. Optimal weights can then be found by solving the multiplier problem:  
   ( )ivu yu'max ,  
                    st   1' =ixv ,         (2) 
   ,0'' ≤− jj xvyu  
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   0, ≥vu        
   
An equivalent duality result can be derived as an envelopment problem: 
θλθ ,min  








where θ is a scalar and λ is a N×1 vector of constants. The value of θ obtained from this 
problem represents the efficiency score for the i-th firm where θ = 1 denotes a fully 
efficient firm operating on the production frontier. The linear programming problem is 
solved for every firm to construct a piece-wise linear isoquant that is consistent with the 
case of constant returns to scale (CRS). A variable returns to scale (VRS) can be explored 
by adding a convexity constraint such as N1’λ=1 to the envelopment problem. Such a 
constraint allows us to construct the production frontier as a convex hull of intersecting 
planes that envelops the data more closely than the conical CRS hull.  
 
Constructing a production frontier based on the type of school-level production function 
specified in equation (1) raises some special methodological challenges. Firstly, as a 
public-sector application, frontier measurement of educational production is faced with 
the common problems of ill-defined input prices, non-competitive markets, and imposed 
environmental conditions (Worthington 2001).  Secondly, the correspondence between 
educational inputs and outputs is difficult to identify. For example, it is difficult to 
understand how expenditures on schooling translate into outputs and how various inputs 
(e.g.: ability, family inputs, school inputs) interact over time (Hanushek 1979, Todd and 
Wolpin 2003). As a result, the DEA application in our next section compares a number of 
input-output specifications and uses the two-stage method to examine the determinants of 
efficiency scores. The two-stage method involves formulating a DEA model with 
“traditional” inputs in the first stage and then regressing the resulting efficiency scores 





In this study we use three different data sources to construct an overall database on 
primary school performance in Queensland. Firstly, we use student administrative records 
from Education Queensland (the Queensland education department) to calculate school 
output measures based on average test scores. Specifically, these output measures are the 
average scaled numeracy and literacy scores for each school. This administrative data also 
provides us with some demographic information on students such as their gender, 
whether they are an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) or from a non-English 
Speaking Background (NESB), and residential postcode. In some cases, these 
demographic variables have been used to create variables on average school-level 
characteristics, most notably the proportion of ATSI students at a school.   
 
Secondly, further demographic variables are created by linking the student administrative 
records to 2001 Census data on the socio-economic characteristics of postcode areas. 
School-level socio-economic indicators are therefore constructed by weighting the 
school-level measure according to the residential distribution of students attending the 
school. Finally, personnel data (based on Education Queensland’s human resource 
information system) is used to calculate input variables describing the teaching labour 
force at each school. This includes inputs related to teacher and teacher aide hours, school 
managers and average teacher experience. Full details on the calculation of these 
variables are given in Appendix A.    
 
The scope of this database provides a unique opportunity to investigate school 
performance in the public education system of a major Australian state. Table 3 reports 
information on the distribution of government and non-government school students 
across the states. Queensland accounts for 20.4% of all Australian primary students in 
government schools (versus 33.7% and 26.3% for NSW and Victoria respectively). Non-
government schooling is slightly less popular in Queensland with only 24.2% of primary 
students attending versus 28.2% (NSW) and 30.6% (Victoria).    An interesting feature of 
the Queensland education system is its high proportion of ATSI students. In 2001 
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Queensland had 22,205 ATSI students enrolled at the primary level, approximately 28.1% 
of all of Australia’s indigenous primary students. The state is therefore in line with 
Western Australia and Tasmania with ATSI students representing around 6% of total 
primary enrolments (see Table 4).     
 
Our sample is based on a student cohort that is tracked from 1999 (Year 5) to 2001 (Year 
7). Education Queensland’s student number system allows us to identify 27,000 
“continuing students”, that is, students who stayed at the same school from Year 5 to 
Year 7.  We calculate school-level average test scores for this group of continuing 
students since their performance can be related to more closely to their school’s 
performance.     
 
Table 5 provides some summary statistics for the 906 schools in our sample4. Queensland 
primary schools have an average enrolment (school size) of 289 students across Years 1-
7. Schools are split between those located in urban areas (45%), rural areas (37%) and 
remote areas (18%). However, the majority of students are located in urban areas (X%), 
indicating that rural and remote schools have  smaller average enrolment numbers. While 
the average proportion of indigenous students per school is 9% the high standard 
deviation also indicates that the distribution of indigenous students across schools is 
uneven.  Average teacher experience or tenure stands at approximately 10.8 years per 
individual teacher and, on average, there are 1.84 managers (e.g.: principals, vice-
principals) present at each school.  
 
Average school test scores by socio-economic category are reported in Table 5(a). Two 
measures of socio-economic structure – based on average income and the proportion of 
adults with degree/diploma qualifications in the school's catchment area – are presented.  
There is a large gap between the top 25% of schools by socio-economic status and the 
rest. Test scores for schools in the top quartile are approximately 15-20 points higher than 
for the next quartile. Surprisingly, in many cases average test scores for schools in the 
bottom quartile are higher than those for the middle two quartiles. This can be explained 
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by the larger concentration of ATSI students in these middle quartiles. The average 
proportion of ATSI students for schools in the middle quartiles is approximately 11% 
compared to 7%-9% for the other quartiles. Table 5(b) reports average test scores by 
quartile for schools a low proportion of ATSI students (less than 10%). This reveals a 
more traditional pattern with average test scores declining as the proportion of adults with 
degree and diploma qualifications falls. However, the inter-quartile variations between 
quartiles 2-4 are flat at best when socio-economic status is measured in terms of average 
income.   
 
4 RESULTS 
(i) Models and Efficiency Scores 
We construct three models of school performance that utilise different combinations of 
inputs and outputs within a DEA framework. These models have been formulated to shed 
light on different aspects of school performance and therefore different types of possible 
efficiency rankings or league tables. Our main objective is too examine how school 
performance varies according to both socio-economic structure and the average prior 
ability of students at a school. A literature stretching back to the Coleman et al (1966) 
report has emphasised the role of socio-economic factors and prior ability in determining 
educational performance.  If either or both of these factors influence the measurement of 
school performance then there will be implications for how quasi-market forces could be 
expected to operate in Australia’s public education system.  
 
Firstly, we must clarify how our study defines “school performance”. Principally, we are 
concerned with school performance from a production economics perspective consistent 
with the EPF outlined above. That is, schools are seen as firms or “decision-making 
units” (DMU’s) responsible for using resource inputs to produce educational outputs. The 
vector of inputs includes labour and capital inputs, together with environmental inputs 
related to the characteristics of the student body. As discussed, school outputs are 
typically defined in terms of academic test scores, although other non-academic outputs 
can be included. Here we focus on outputs based on academic test scores since (i) such an 
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approach allows us to make consistent comparisons with output measures based on “raw” 
average scores and (ii) data limitations prevent us from considering other potential 
outputs, such as absence rates, student satisfaction, or the quality of non-cognitive skills. 
Therefore our models define school performance in terms of the economic efficiency of 
schools. This contrasts for example with multi-faceted, qualitative discussions of school 
performance in the educational statistics literature (Rowe 2000).    
 
The four models are described in Table 7. Each model uses Year 7 literacy and numeracy 
scores as outputs. Furthermore, note that each of these models reflect different 
relationships in the school-level production function outlined in equation (1) above. 
Model 1 is simplest model, using only teacher labour force variables as part of its input 
vector. This model corresponds most closely with a simple or “raw” model of school 
efficiency that ranks schools according to their average test score. Model 2 adds socio-
economic variables into the inputs vector as non-discretionary inputs. These include input 
variables describing the income in the school's catchment area, diploma / degree 
qualifications in the catchment area, and the proportion of indigenous students attending 
the school. These environmental variables were chosen to allow for variation across a 
number of socio-economic characteristics. For example, schools in some areas may 
benefit from an environment where the catchment area population has high levels of 
human capital as well as high levels of income. Other schools may be exposed to a local 
population with high incomes but lower levels of human capital and so on. Finally, Model 
3 is formulated as a “value-added” model. That is, it includes prior ability as part of the 
input vector in order to measure how efficient schools are at producing increases in 
average test scores relative to their student’s performance in Year 5. Model 3 also 
incorporates socio-economic variables as non-discretionary inputs. Therefore, among our 
three models, Model 3 is the most complete representation of the school-level production 
function outlined in the previous section.            
 
A summary of the efficiency scores produced by these different models is reported in 
Table 8. Model 1 is characterised by mean efficienc
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and VRS models respectively.  The minimum efficiency score of 5.0-5.4 also indicates 
that this model has a wide range. Overall, this indicates that a large degree of technical 
efficiency exists among schools when a vector of labour-inputs is included as the only 
input. The inclusion of socio-economic variables in Model 2 has a dramatic effect. Mean 
efficiency scores rise to 79.8 and 82.2 for the CRS and VRS models. The range is more 
limited with a minimum score of 42.5 for both models. The addition of prior ability in 
Model 3 stimulates further improvements. The mean CRS and VRS efficiency scores rise 
to 93.8 and 95.1 respectively, with minimum scores of 77.3-77.4. Clearly then, the 
inclusion of environmental variables in Models 2 and 3 reduces the degree of technical 
inefficiency in school performance that is evident in Model 1. Furthermore, the small 
differences in mean CRS and VRS efficiency scores across the models suggests that scale 
economies played a limited role in explaining the efficiency of the primary schools 
analysed in this sample.     
 
A comparison of the distribution of efficiency scores across the models is shown in 
Figure 2. There is both a large level and slope shift when moving from Model 1 to 
Models 2 and 3. Furthermore, there is a level shift of approximately 0.3 between Models 
2 and 3. Interestingly, the distribution of scores for Models 2 and 3 begin to converge as 
we approach higher the efficiency scores. Therefore, the introduction of prior ability in 
the first stage seems to have a greater effect on technical efficiency in the lower half of 
the score distribution.   
 
As a check on the robustness of our results, Table 9 presents DEA estimates where the 
least and most efficient schools are omitted from the analysis. This is performed 3 times 
recursively for model 1 to model 3 respectively. The reported results suggest that our 
DEA estimates are robust to efficiency outliers.  
 
(iii) Rank Correlations. 
The Spearman rank correlations in Table 10 offer some further comparative information 
on Models 1-3. Firstly, it is important to note the differences between comparisons of 
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school based on average test scores (ie: a “raw” or unadjusted league table of schools) 
and rankings based on the application of DEA methods. The Spearman rank correlation 
results in Table 10 indicate that the correlation between the raw and model-based 
rankings was low, ranging between approximately 0.26 and 0.38. In contrast, there is a 
stronger correlation between Models 1 to 3. Between all models, the rank correlation 
coefficient ranged between 0.53 (Model 1 and Model 3) to 0.65 (Model 1 and Model 2).  
 
Interpreting these rank correlations is difficult since we do not have an indicator of the 
“true” efficiency ranking of schools or indeed statistical distribution results. However, 
two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it is interesting to note that the rank correlations 
are stable across Models 1-3. This indicates that there may be some robustness in the 
results, including systematic patterns of school performance. Secondly, to the extent that 
the “raw” league table rankings depart from our DEA-based measures we can say that the 
raw rankings convey limited information regarding the influence of socio-economic 
factors and prior ability on school performance. As a result, it can be argued that the role 
of “raw” league tables in providing signals of school efficiency or quality is at best 
limited. 
 
(iv) Determinants of Efficiency – Second-Stage Tobit 
 
Finally, regression analysis is used to provide some evidence on the determinants of 
school efficiency. We use the results from Model 1 as our measure of school efficiency as 
this only includes those inputs which are directly in the control of the school / education 
department. Furthermore, efficiency may be related to scale economies, we examine this 
by utilising the CRS results and including school enrolments to investigate the impact of 
school size on efficiency. Socio-economic variables (income level), and variables 
identifying schools with a high proportion of indigenous students, and the location of the 
school (remote and rural) are also included. Finally, a fixed effects model is estimated to 
account for local area effects (Model 2) while two variables are added to the basic model 
to examine the potential effects of inter-school competition (Model 3).   
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Efficiency scores are limited to the [0,1] interval, and some scores lie on the upper limit 
of one, as a result a Tobit model is used which allows for right censoring of the dependant 
variable (Yi). This provides:  
 
iii xY εβ +′=  if Yi<1;  
Yi  = 1 otherwise.   
 
Where Yi  is the efficiency score of the ith school. 
 
Regression estimates are provided in Table 11. School efficiency is positively related to 
school size, indicating the presence of scale economies, although the negative sign on the 
quadratic term implies that this effect diminishes as school size increases. School 
efficiency is positively related to the income levels of student background, indicating that 
socio-economic background can be categorized as an input into school production.  
Conversely, school efficiency decreases with the proportion of school students that are 
indigenous, this is indicative of the difficulties involved with indigenous education in 
Australia. At the same time, schools in remote locations also suffer a 4 point penalty to 
measured technical efficiency. These last two results are of particular interest as many 
schools with high proportions of indigenous students are located in remote areas of 
Queensland. This means that, other things being equal, these schools will tend to perform 
poorly in either “raw” league table or simple school input-based models of technical 
efficiency. This is a concern as clearly neither indigenous composition of students or 
regional location of school is in the control of school decision makers.  
 
The fixed effects term in Model 2 is defined at the local government area (LGA) level and 
therefore accounts for region-specific variations in school efficiency. Such region-specific 
effects are important insofar that they could be collinear with variables such as average 
income, rural school and remote school. Here, the inclusion of the fixed effects term 
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improves the precision of the estimates for average income, rural school and remote 
school, while the magnitude of the co-efficients is similar to the basic model. 
 
Model 3 uses two variables to test for the potential effects of inter-school competition. 
The number of government schools per LGA is used to represent the potential 
competition a school faces from other government schools in the local area. That is, 
where catchment areas overlap there is potential for schools to compete in terms of 
reputation and perceived performance. However, these effects are likely to be weak in the 
absence of clear signalling mechanisms, such as league tables. Despite this the variable 
representing competition among government schools is significant at the 5% level. 
Furthermore, the co-efficient estimate indicates that the hypothetical introduction of a 
new school in an LGA raises the efficiency of affected schools by 0.16 of a percentage 
point. The other variable tested is one representing competition from non-government 
schools within an LGA. Competition from non-government schools has the potential to 
exert two opposite effects. It can either increase efficiency by encouraging government 
schools to maintain and improve their performance or it can reduce efficiency by 
attracting the best students (usually from higher socio-economic backgrounds) in a 
process of “cream-skimming”. Empirically, we find weak evidence of a negative effect  
from non-government school competition – approximately 0.17 of percentage point for 
each additional non-government school in an LGA at the 10% significance level.     
 
It must be noted that this can only be interpreted as preliminary evidence of competitive 
effects. Further data and more complex variables are needed to establish the effects with 




Recent reforms to Australia’s primary and secondary education system have resulted in an 
increased emphasis on performance measurement and an increased role for market 
mechanisms. In this context, it is useful to look to the UK’s experience of quasi-markets 
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to ask questions about possible policy directions for Australia. We have used this 
background to motivate two questions. Firstly, how well do unadjusted school league 
tables perform as signals of school performance, given the important role of socio-
economic status and student intake quality? Secondly, to what extent are market forces – 
particularly those related to school competition - already operating in Australia’s 
regulated education system? Answers to these questions are critical to evaluating the 
potential success of quasi-market reforms in Australia.         
 
Our analysis of a large database of Queensland primary schools provides some insights 
into these issues. On the first question, there are striking differences in the school 
performance rankings that are suggested by a “raw” league table that uses average test 
scores and the rankings produced by model-based methods that account for socio-
economic factors and intake quality. The raw league table rankings are consistent with 
model-based rankings in only 22%-38% of cases, depending on model structure. Given 
that we do not know the “true” distribution of school efficiency or quality it is difficult to 
evaluate how accurate the raw and model-based rankings are in practice. However, the 
limited correlations between the raw rankings and model-based rankings suggest that the 
former measures do not adequately reflect the influence of socio-economic factors and 
intake quality. In practice then, raw league tables understate the performance of schools in 
disadvantaged socio-economic areas.  
 
Briefly, this means that an Australian quasi-market model centred on an unadjusted 
league table would face important signalling and incentive problems. The main problem 
with using unadjusted test scores as signals of school performance is that it increases the 
scope for schools to “game the system”. That is, using unadjusted league tables as the 
principal performance indicator in a quasi-market model opens up a route for schools to 
improve their (perceived) performance by optimising the structure of their student body, 
either in terms of socio-economic composition or prior academic ability. Furthermore, as 
this performance indicator is adopted by parents as a determinant of school choice it 
exerts a pressure for increased social segregation between schools, as found in the UK 
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system by Bradley and Taylor (2002). In turn, these problems could be expected to affect 
the nature of the equity-efficiency trade off that would result if market-oriented reforms 
were implemented in Australia. The trade-off would be effected in two ways. Firstly, as 
student composition becomes more polarised, social segregation would obviously reduce 
the equity of outcomes between schools. Secondly, to the extent that improvements in 
performance (as measured by raw average test scores) are secured through “gaming” by 
schools then this would artificially inflate the magnitude of the system-wide efficiency 
gains.   
 
In terms of our second question, the results of the second stage Tobit regression indicate 
that school efficiency in our sample is affected by inter-school competition, albeit weakly. 
Specifically, our results suggest that increased competition between government schools 
has the potential to increase school efficiency. On the other hand, the results also suggest 
that the interaction between government and non-government schools must be managed 
carefully to avoid “cream skimming” and other negative effects associated with 
competition between the two systems. Of course, our results are subject to the caveat that 
these competitive effects need to be established with more certainty using further data and 
more complex models of competition. However, it must be noted that the UK evidence 
indicates that inter-school competition was a driving force of efficiency gains (Bradley et 
al 2002). The findings presented above therefore raise the prospect that competition could 
have similar benefits for the efficiency of the Australian system, if managed correctly.    
 
This last caveat is of special importance. Australian policy-makers do have an 
opportunity to design and manage a more effective framework for primary and secondary 
schooling. The UK experience has produced research and data that is able to inform the 
Australian situation. In addition, as Leigh and Wolfers (2003) argue, compared to 
previous eras Australian policy-makers now have the opportunity to engage in more 
detailed “evidence-based” policy development.  This can be described as  “the notion that 
policy ideas should stand or fall on the basis of research and trials, rather than opinion 
polling and supposition”. In conclusion, we suggest that further use of the type of 
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administrative data used in this study has the potential to fuel this process of evidence-
based policy development.      
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 Gradstein and Justman (2000), for example, present a theoretical model that shows that public education 
increases social cohesion. 
2
 See the National Report for Schooling 2000 – Preliminary Paper (MCEETYA, 2001) for an outline and 
discussion of these benchmarks. 
3
 By “school choice” model we mean an explicitly privatised, voucher-centred system as per many US 
proposals. Glennerster (1991:1268) points out that the British model falls short of a full market solution 
because (a) funding cannot follow students into the private sector and (b) the entry of new providers is 
restricted.   
4
 A number of schools (160) were omitted from the analysis due to missing observations or very low 
enrolment numbers (5 students or less).  
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Table 1: Educational Reforms and Quasi-Market Forces 
 






Incentives Information Choice Voice 
Formula Funding √ √ - - - 
Local Management of 
Schools 
√ 
- - - - 
Open Enrolment - - - √ - 
Opting-Out √ - - √ - 
Technology Colleges - - - √ - 
School-site governance √ - - - - 
School Performance Tables - √ √ - √ 
      
Source: Bradley et al (2000:359). 
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Table 2: School Performance Information in Australia (Year 12), 2002. 
State / Territory Information 
New South Wales Publishes names and schools of students with achieving more than 90% 
in each subject. 
Victoria School-by-School information on: 
- Median study scores in the Victorian Certificate of Education 
- Rates of satisfactory completion. 
- Post-Year 12 “Transition Profile” of student employment and 
education destinations. 
Queensland Assessment is school-based with no information made public. 
South Australia A list of students who achieve a perfect Year 12 score is published, 
though no comparative data is made available. 
Western Australia Year 12 results are made available to newspapers for a fee and are 
subsequently published. 
Tasmania Names and schools of the students achieving in the top 0.5% are 
published. 
ACT Publishes the average University Admissions Index for each school.  
Northern Territory Names, schools and scores of the top 20 students are published each 
year. 
































New South Wales 71.8 28.2 32.7 33.7 
Victoria 69.4 30.6 22.7 26.3 
Queensland 75.8 24.2 20.4 17.1 
South Australia 71.7 28.3 8.3  8.6 
Western Australia 74.4 25.6 10.3 9.3 
Tasmania 77.7 22.3 2.6 2.0 
Northern Territory 80.2 19.8 1.5 1.0 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
66.0 34.0 1.5 2.1 
Australia 72.4 27.6 100 1.000 
Source: ABS (2002) Schools, Australia  (Cat: 4221.0). 
(1) Proportion of all primary students attending government schools. 
(2) Proportion of all primary students attending non-government schools. 
(3) Given state or territory’s share of all government primary school students in Australia. 
(4) Given state or territory’s share of all non-government primary school students in Australia. 
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Students –  
Total  
(2) 







Share - Australian 
Indigenous Students 
(%) 
New South Wales 22,208 630,261 3.5 28.1 
Victoria 4,101 453,766 0.9 5.2 
Queensland 22,205 372,316 6.0 28.1 
South Australia 5,002 159,400 3.1 6.3 
Western Australia 12,211 191,633 6.4 15.5 
Tasmania 2,806 46,872 6.0 3.6 
Northern Territory 9,780 25,675 38.1 12.4 
ACT  630 32,490 1.9 0.8 
Australia 78,943 1,912,413 4.1 100.0 
Source: ABS (2002) Schools, Australia  (Cat: 4221.0). 
(1) Total number of primary indigenous students. 
(2) Total number of primary indigenous and non-indigenous students. 
(3) Proportion of primary indigenous students. 







 Table 5: School Characteristics, 2001. 
 Mean Std Dev 
School Enrolment 288.73 250.35 
Urban School 0.45 0.50 
Remote School 0.18 0.38 
Rural School 0.37 0.48 
School Prop. Indigenous 0.09 0.15 
   
School Average Income 391.15 63.37 
School Literacy Year 7 678.53 44.81 
School Numeracy Yr7 675.33 49.79 
School Numeracy Yr5 591.96 42.73 
School Literacy Year 5 604.99 40.12 
   
Teacher Experience 3961.61 1860.87 
Teacher Hours 494.72 415.76 
Manager FTEs 1.84 1.20 
Observations 906  
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Income       
Quartile 1 690.1 688 615.5 603.8 0.08 346 
Quartile 2 674.9 670 598.5 586.8 0.11 315 
Quartile 3 671.6 668 599.5 587.3 0.114 273 
Quartile 4 677.6 675.6 603.9 589.9 0.072 221 
Degree / Diploma 
 
      
Quartile 1 693.4 690.3 619.3 606.6 0.07 328 
Quartile 2 672.7 668.9 597.8 586.2 0.11 290 
Quartile 3 672.5 671.3 600.6 587.6 0.10 268 
Quartile 4 675.5 670.9 599.8 587.5 0.09 270 
(1) Average Year 7 Literacy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(2) Average Year 7 Numeracy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(3)  Average Year 5 Literacy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(4) Average Year 5 Numeracy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(5) Average proportion of ATSI students per school. 
(6) Average school enrolments. 
 
 Table 6(b): Average School Test Scores by Socio-Economic Status, where Proportion 






















Quartile 1 700.9 696.9 623.9 610.0 0.08 346 
Quartile 2 687.4 683.9 610.9 599.8 0.11 315 
Quartile 3 683.0 680.0 610.6 598.5 0.114 273 
Quartile 4 686.1 685.5 610.6 595.2 0.072 221 
Degree / Diploma 
 
      
Quartile 1  703.7 701.1 627.1 613.5 0.07 328 
Quartile 2  688.0 685.0 610.7 599.1 0.11 290 
Quartile 3 682.8 683.9 611.7 599.0 0.10 268 
Quartile 4 682.4 675.8 605.7 590.7 0.09 270 
(1) Average Year 7 Literacy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(2) Average Year 7 Numeracy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(3)  Average Year 5 Literacy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(4) Average Year 5 Numeracy score per school. Scaled score between 500-900. 
(5) Average proportion of ATSI students per school, calculated at Year 7 (2001). 




Table 7: Overview of DEA Models 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  
  Inputs  
Teacher Hours  √ √ √ 
Manager Numbers √ √ √ 
Teacher Experience √ √ √ 
Diploma and Degree 
Qualifications 
 √ √ 
Average Personal Income  √ √ 
Proportion of School Indigenous  √ √ 
Year 5 Prior Ability (Literacy)   √ 
Year 5 Prior Ability (Numeracy)   √ 
    
  Outputs  
Year 7 Literacy √ √ √ 




Table 8: DEA Models of School Efficiency. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS 
       
Mean 47.1 55.0 79.8 82.2 93.8 95.1 
Min 5.0 5.4 42.5 42.5 77.3 77.4 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 




TABLE 9 Stability of DEA, Jacknife Results.  
   Number of 
Efficient Schools 
Mean Efficiency 
Model 1  1st Jacknife CRS 10 47.2 
  VRS 28 55.0 
 2nd Jacknife CRS 10 47.2 
  VRS 28 55.1 
 3rd Jacknife CRS 10 47.3 
  VRS 28 55.1 
Model 2  1st Jacknife CRS 56 79.9 
  VRS 90 82.2 
 2nd Jacknife CRS 56 80.0 
  VRS 90 82.2 
 3rd Jacknife CRS 56 80.0 
  VRS 90 82.3 
Model 3  1st Jacknife CRS 96 93.9 
  VRS 174 95.1 
 2nd Jacknife CRS 96 93.9 
  VRS 174 95.2 
 3rd Jacknife CRS 96 93.9 
  VRS 174 95.2 
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Table 10:  Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients - Models 1 to 3.  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Raw League Table Literacy 0.2686 0.3067 0.3409 
 Numeracy 0.2138 0.3540 0.3900 
 Composite 0.2490 0.3515 0.4034 
Model 2 CRS 0.5631  0.6338 
 VRS 0.4888  0.6611 
Model 3 CRS 0.4769   
 VRS 0.6336   
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TABLE 11 Determinants of School Efficiency (CRS Model 1) – Tobit Results 
 (1) Basic (2)Fixed Effect (3)Competition 
 Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio 
School Enrolment 0.06 7.63 0.06 7.61 0.06 7.77 
School Enrolment2 -3*10-5 -3.38 -3*10-5 -3.55 -3*10-5 -3.49 
Remote School -3.27 -1.62 -6.81 -1.71 -1.42 -0.63 
Rural School 1.79 1.08 3.69 1.91 2.86 1.57 
Proportion of Indigenous Students  -30.38 -7.04 -29.78 -5.68 -30.59 -7.07 
Income Level 0.02 2.22 0.05 3.07 0.02 2.16 
Number of Govt Schools in LGA     0.18 2.39 
Number of Non-Govt Schools in LGA     -0.16 -1.55 
Constant 27.32 6.18 36.09 2.61 23.79 5.11 
Pseudo r2 0.04  0.06  0.04  
Observations 906  906  906  
(1) Basic model. Includes school enrolment, remote school, rural school, proportion ATSI and catchment 
area average income. 
(2) Fixed Effect model: Includes fixed effect models for local area efects. 
(3) Competition Model: Adds variables representing competition to the basic model. Variables include: 
number of government schools in the local government area (LGA) and non-government schools in the 
LGA.   
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